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Abstract
This paper examines the simulated labour supply responses to the personal tax
and transfer policy changes introduced in New Zealand in 2010, and the implications
for revenue and income distribution. The main changes examined are the increase
in the GST rate from 12.5 to 15 per cent, along with reductions in personal income
tax rates and increases in the main benefit payments and assistance to families with
children, to compensate for the rise in GST. The simulated labour supply responses
were obtained using the Treasury’s behavioural microsimulation model, TaxWell-B.
The 2009/10 Household Economic Survey (HES) was used. The combined effect of
all policy changes is to increase average labour supply slightly for all demographic
groups. Labour force participation of sole parents is simulated to increase by 0.86
percentage points. In considering separate components, the change in income tax
rates is found to have the largest effect on labour supply. This is not surprising
given that it affected a large proportion of the population while the changes to the
benefit system and assistance to families with children apply only to certain groups.
The reforms are found to be approximately distribution neutral, in terms of the Gini
inequality measure of after-tax income per adult equivalent person.
JEL Classification: C25; J22
Keywords: Taxes and transfers; labour supply; discrete choice model; microsimula-
tion; New Zealand.
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1 Introduction
In October 2010, several policy changes were implemented to the New Zealand personal tax
and social security system, as part of a larger package of tax reforms, including changes to
corporation tax, excise taxes and depreciation rules. The changes included an increase in
the Goods and Services Tax (GST) rate from 12.5 to 15 per cent, combined with reduced
personal income tax rates and increases in the main benefit payments and assistance to
families with children.1 The reforms, involving a shift in the tax mix from direct to indirect
taxes, were motivated by a desire to increase economic efficiency and stimulate growth
and savings. The argument is based on comparisons of excess tax burdens and empirical
studies of the relationship between growth and different forms of taxation: see also the Tax
Working Group (2010) and Mirrlees (2011). A number of the reforms were suggested in the
report of the independent Tax Working Group (2010), conducted under the aegis of Victoria
University of Wellington and Chaired by Professor Bob Buckle.2
In the multi-rate income tax structure, income thresholds were unchanged but a set
of marginal tax rate changes were introduced whereby the percentage reductions in the
rates were lower for higher marginal rates. They were designed with the aim of leaving the
distributional effects of the direct tax and transfer system largely unchanged, along with
total revenue.
The increase in the GST rate had the effect of increasing consumer prices and hence
reducing households’ real disposable (net) incomes. The compensation for the increase in
consumer prices, by reducing personal income tax rates, clearly affects only those who are
working and paying income tax. Those relying on transfer payments are compensated by the
increase in main benefit payments, in particular theWorking for Families (WfF) payment. In
a preliminary analysis of a change in the tax mix, Creedy and Mellish (2011), concentrating
on those paying income tax and using a cross-sectional framework with unchanged labour
supply, showed that the reforms were expected to be approximately revenue and distribution
neutral, though it is not possible to achieve these joint objectives precisely.
1The Hon. Bill English, Minister of Finance, stated (2010) that, ‘Tax reform is a centrepiece of this
budget’.
2The influence of the report is underscored by the statement (2010) of the Hon. John Key, Prime
Minister, that ‘the Tax Working Group discussed a broad range of options for tax reform. The Government
has considered all of these options closely ... While the Government has ruled out some of the proposals ...
most of the options discussed by the group still remain on the table’. For reflections on the review process,
see Buckle (2010, 2015).
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The tax changes would be expected to influence labour supply incentives at both the
intensive and extensive margins, that is, hours worked and participation in the labour
market. In examining the likely effects on labour supply, New Zealand Treasury (2010)
used estimates of average wage elasticities relating to hours worked and participation for five
demographic groups (married men and women, single men and women, and sole parents),
obtained by Kalb and Scutella (2003). These aggregative results were based on the earlier
Treasury simulation model, TaxMod-B, but at the time of the 2010 changes, this model
was no longer operational, so that more disaggregated modelling was not possible: see New
Zealand Treasury (2010c).
It is therefore useful to evaluate the detailed labour supply responses to these policy
changes, allowing for the considerable extent of population heterogeneity that exists. This
paper presents ex ante simulations of the effects on labour supply of the policy changes made
in 2010, using the Treasury’s new behavioural microsimulation model for New Zealand,
TaxWell-B. The model also allows the full distributional implications of the policy changes
to be examined, after allowing for potential labour supply effects.
TaxWell-B models the New Zealand population based on the Household Economic Sur-
vey (HES), which contains information about the characteristics of individuals and house-
holds and their labour supply and earnings. Individuals are regarded as choosing labour
supply from a discrete set of hours levels. Utility functions contain both a deterministic
component, which can also reflect the individual’s characteristics, and a random compo-
nent. This gives rise to a probability distribution over the set of discrete hours points. It is
a partial-equilibrium supply-side model where, effectively, it is assumed that all additional
labour supply is met at unchanged wages by a sufficient demand for labour. Individuals
in reality may not be able to work their desired number of hours and outcomes may be
determined to some extent by the availability of jobs. In simulating the policy change, the
model is calibrated to the observed labour supply to ensure that, for each individual, the
simulated optimal labour supply in the pre-reform situation is the same as the observed
(discretised) labour supply: on discrete hours modelling and the calibration approach in
microsimulation, see Creedy and Kalb (2005).
The increase in the consumption tax rate was found to result in an increase in the
Consumer Price Indices (CPI) by 2 per cent: see Statistics New Zealand (2010). This
was applied to determine the level of compensation for benefit payments, WfF and other
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payments such as New Zealand Superannuation. The same indexation was applied in this
paper to account for the rise in the GST.
This paper examines the effects of the tax-and-transfer changes in 2010 on the labour
supply of New Zealand individuals and households and on government expenditure and
revenue, with and without allowing for labour supply responses. The Household Economic
Survey (HES) for 2009/10 was used for simulations of the effect of the change in tax and
transfer rules from April 2010 to October 2010. Couples, single men, single women and
sole parents are examined separately. Throughout this paper the terms married men and
women refer to partnered men and women regardless of whether they are married legally or
de facto. The labour supply responses produced by TaxWell-B are measured by a change in
the probability of working and the change in the average hours of work (that is, the expected
value over the conditional distribution of discrete hours levels after the policy change). More
detailed information is also provided by transition matrices for each demographic group.
Changes in inequality are also examined.
It is also possible to examine the effect of the policy changes separately for each compo-
nent. Individual policy changes included in this paper are the personal income tax, WfF and
main benefit payments. The superannuation payment was adjusted, as mentioned above,
using the CPI indexation. However, only the labour supply responses for working-age indi-
viduals were simulated. It should be recognised that the combined effect of changes does not
necessarily equal the sum of all individual changes, since the components are not additive.
Section 2 briefly describes the main relevant tax and benefit changes. Section 3 describes
the behavioural microsimulation approach and the data used. Section 4 presents simula-
tion labour supply changes for the different demographic groups. The implications for tax
revenue are examined in Section 5. The effect on the distribution of disposable income is
reported in Section 6. Section 7 examines the effects of the policy changes separately for
each component. Section 8 concludes.
2 The 2010 tax changes
Subsection 2.1 summarises the details of the tax rate and benefit changes made in 2010.3 The
changes operate via their effects on individuals’ budget constraints showing the relationship
3In more recent years some of these benefits have been replaced by Jobseeker Support (JSS) and Sole
Parent Support (SPS), introduced in July 2013.
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between hours worked and net incomes. It is therefore useful to consider in Subsection 2.2
some examples of the ways in which the reform affected budget constraints, for a number
of hypothetical individuals.
2.1 Tax and transfer policy changes
Table 1 summarises the changes made to the basic income tax schedule and the tax credits
relating to the benefit, Working for Families (WfF). All income tax rates were reduced
as part of the tax shift, while the income thresholds remained unchanged, and tax credit
levels were increased. The changes made to the main benefit types are indicated in Table
2, showing that all benefit levels were increased, reflecting the increase in the Goods and
Services Tax (GST) rate from 12.5 to 15 per cent.
Table 1: Income Tax rates and Working for Families Tax Credits
Income tax rates (per cent)
Income band ($ annual) Pre-Oct 2010 From Oct 2010
0 to 14,000 12.5 10.5
14,001 to 48,000 21 17.5
48,001 to 70,000 33 30
70,000 and over 38 33
Working for Families tax credit
Family tax credit rates ($ annual) Pre-Oct 2010 From Oct 2010
First or only child, 0-15 years 4,487 4,578
First or only child, 16-18 years 5,198 5,303
Second or subsequent child, 0-12 years 3,119 3,182
Second or subsequent child, 13-15 years 3,557 3,629
Second or subsequent child, 16-18 years 4,651 4,745
Minimum family tax credit rates ($ annual)
Rates 20,800 21,216
2.2 Examples of budget constraints
In considering the possible effect on labour supply of a tax reform, the budget constraint
facing individuals plays a crucial role. Hence it is first useful to examine the way in which net
income, and the schedule of effective marginal tax rates, vary as the number of hours of work
increases, for hypothetical individuals with specified gross wage rates. Each individual’s
constraint depends crucially on personal circumstances and the wage rate, so the examples
given here can be illustrative only.
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Table 2: Main benefits allowances ($ weekly)
Benefit type Pre-Oct 2010 From Oct 2010
Unemployment Benefit and Sickness Benefit
Single 18-19 years -At home 129.41 132.02
Single 18-19 years -Away from home 161.76 165.03
Single 20-24 year 161.76 165.03
Single 25 years or over 194.12 198.04
Sole parent 278.04 283.66
Married, civil union or defacto couple per person 161.76 165.03
Domestic Purposes Benefit
Woman alone (Single adult) 202.20 206.28
Sole parent 278.04 283.66
Carer, single 16-17 years 196.35 200.32
Carer, single 18 years or over 242.63 247.53
Carer, sole parent 318.75 325.19
Married, civil union or defacto couple per person 202.20 206.28
Invalids Benefit
Single 16-17 years 196.35 200.32
Single 18 years or over 242.63 247.53
Sole parent 318.75 325.19
Married, civil union or defacto couple per person 202.20 206.28
Independent Youth Benefit
Single or married, civil union or defacto 161.76 165.03
Widow’s Benefit
Woman alone (single adult) 202.20 206.28
Sole parent 278.04 283.66
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Figures 1 to 4 show the effect of the reform on disposable incomes and effective marginal
tax rates (EMTRs) for four hypothetical individuals. These are, respectively: a sole parent
with one child;4 the male in a couple with two children; the female in a couple with two
children and; a single person. These net incomes are disposable incomes after the direct
tax and transfer system, and hence do not include the effect of the higher GST rate in
reducing the real value of expenditure: allowance for the GST increase is, however, made
in the simulations below. For simplicity, these households are assumed not to receive the
benefit, Accommodation Supplement, although again this is modelled in the simulations
reported below. Furthermore, allowance also needs to be made for a fixed cost of working,
which means that at zero hours of work, disposable income is higher than the intercept on
the vertical axis shown in each of the figures. Hence, the budget constraint has a short
vertical segment, the length of which equals the fixed cost of working.
Figure 1: EMTR and Budget Constraint: A Sole Parent
The sole parent shown in Figure 1 is assumed to have one child aged three, and faces
a gross wage rate of $13.70 per hour. The hypothetical person is assumed to pay annual
rent of $11,000. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the budget constraints and EMTR for a couple
with two children, the youngest of which is three years of age. The male faces a gross
wage rate of $18.30 per hour and the female has $14.00 per hour. They pay annual rent of
around $12,000. Figure 2 shows the net incomes and EMTRs as the male labour supply are
increased, on the assumption that the female does not work. The EMTR for the married
male is lower in most ranges of labour supply post-reform, with the largest decrease in the
30-hour work range where the family starts to receive the in-work tax credit (IWTC). Figure
4Male and female sole parents are combined in the following analysis, the vast majority being female.
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Figure 2: EMTR and Budget Constraint: A Married Man
Figure 3: EMTR and Budget Constraint: A Married Woman
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3 shows the budget constraint and EMTRs for the female, assuming that the male works 40
hours a week. The constraint for this hypothetical individual differs from that of the others
examined here in that it does not appear to have the kind of non-convexity in the budget set
associated with exhaustion of means-tested benefits. However, the effect of the fixed cost of
working is to introduce a non-convexity right at the beginning of the constraint. Such fixed
costs imply that very low working hours are unlikely to be supplied.
Figure 4 presents the budget constraint and EMTRs for a single woman without children
on a wage of $12.60 per hour and paying annual rent of $9,200. This is equivalent to
the statutory minimum wage in New Zealand: see Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment (2014). As shown in Figure 4, the EMTR decrease for single woman is at its
highest in the 36-hour work range where she starts to receive the Independent Earner tax
credit (IETC). The IETC is a tax credit available to New Zealand tax residents who earn
annual income between $24,000 and $48,000, are not entitled to WfF tax credits and are
not receiving income-tested benefit, New Zealand Superannuation and Veteran’s Pension.
The budget constraint and EMTR for a single man is similar to that of the single woman,
with the same wage.
All figures show that the disposable or net incomes after the reform are higher than
pre-reform, remembering that they do not allow for the higher GST rate. The EMTRs for
all households have decreased over most work-hour ranges.
For the hypothetical sole parent, the decrease is at its highest in the 40-hour work range
where there is a sharp fall in the EMTR (the negative range is not shown in the figure). This
is where the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) is completely abated and the person starts
to receive the in-work tax credit (IWTC) from the WfF. The WfF tax credits comprise four
main tax credits: the family tax credit (FTC); the in-work tax credit (IWTC); the minimum
family tax credit (MFTC); and the parental tax credit (PTC). The first two are observed in
the hypothetical sole parent. All families with children are eligible for the family tax credit
(FTC) regardless of whether they have been receiving income-tested benefit. The IWTC is
work-tested where sole parents must work at least 20 hours per week and to be eligible, do
not receive any main welfare benefit. Hence, the sole parent receives FTC from 0-hour and
at 40-hour work the person receives both FCT and IWTC until FCT starts to be abated at
$36,827 of the family annual income. The person may receive IWTC above 20 hours of work
if the person earns a relatively low wage rate and still receives some main welfare benefits.
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Figure 4: EMTR and Budget Constraint: A Single Woman
Except for the hypothetical married woman, the constraints have several kinks where
there are convexities and non-convexities in the budget sets. These reflect respectively
the income thresholds where there are increases in the EMTR and reductions in effective
rates. The latter arise where individuals exhaust their eligibility for a means-tested benefit.
The budget constraints for the sole parent and the married woman have discontinuities at
particular hours levels where WfF tax credits begins to be received. The implications for
labour supply of this type of discontinuity, arising from an hours threshold, is discussed in
detail in Creedy (2005).
In the case where hours of work can be varied continuously, the piecewise-linear budget
constraints can give rise to a complex range of labour supply responses. In cases where
the marginal tax rate rises at an income threshold, an increase in the net wage rate causes
the (concave) kink in the budget line to move horizontally to the left (as the threshold is
reached at a lower hours level). This kind of kink is associated with a certain amount of
‘stickiness’ where the individual remains at the kink for a range of wage rates. For the
2010 simulations, the income thresholds and gross wage remain unchanged. This means
that labour supply remains unchanged at such kink points: the hours levels at which the
upward rises in the effective marginal tax rates take place are unchanged, as shown in the
hypothetical examples.
In the opposite case where the marginal tax rate falls, or there is a discontinuity associ-
ated with a tax credit with an hours threshold, the range where there is a non-convexity can
give rise to large ‘jumps’ in hours for very small variations in the wage rate. This is because
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a single indifference curve can be tangential to two segments of the budget constraint, or it
can be tangential to one section while simultaneously touching a corner of the constraint.
For further discussion of the complexities arising from this type of budget constraint in the
continuous-hours context, see Creedy (2004).
For the tax reforms considered here, it is thus difficult to predict, a priori, how labour
supply is likely to vary for a particular individual, since it depends on where the individual
is on the initial (pre-reform) budget line, and whether a ‘jump’ may take place or whether
the individual is at a threshold where ‘stickiness’ is involved. Further complications also
obviously arise in view of the existence of both and income and substitution effects of changes
in the net wage, the ‘price of leisure’. A full analysis of the expected labour supply effects
of a tax reform therefore requires the use of a behavioural microsimulation model that is
able to capture the full heterogeneity of the population as well as the full complexity of the
income tax and benefit system. As mentioned above, such a model was not available in New
Zealand at the time of the reforms and for this reason policy advice was based on earlier
highly aggregate estimates of a labour supply elasticity.5 The following section provides a
very brief description of the current behavioural microsimulation model maintained by the
Treasury, called TaxWell-B.
3 The Treasury’s Microsimulation Model
The Treasury’s behavioural microsimulation model is based on the Melbourne Institute
Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), a simulation model for Australia: see Creedy et al.
(2002). The basis of the labour supply modelling is a structural model where individuals
are assumed to be able to work a number of discrete hours only. Each individual maximises
a utility function whose arguments are net income and leisure. Couples maximise a joint
utility function. There is a deterministic component of utility: this takes a quadratic form
where parameters depend on a range of individual and family characteristics. In addition, a
random component is added, reflecting ‘optimising errors’, so that each discrete hours level
5The earlier Treasury behavioural model, called TaxMod-B, had not been maintained and could not be
integrated with the newer non-behavioural model then in existence, TaxWell. An extensive programme of
work was required to convert TaxMod-B to TaxWell-B and to re-estimate all the necessary imputed wages
and preference functions. This was completed in 2014. The first application of this model, an analysis of
Working for Families, is reported in Mok and Mercante (2014).
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has associated with it a probability level for each person.6 The discrete hours approach
has substantial advantages over the continuous hours model; for a pioneering study using
discrete hours, see Van Soest (1995). For further references and an exposition of estimation
and simulation, see Creedy and Kalb (2005). The random component of utility is assumed
to follow the Type-I extreme-value distribution.
TaxWell is a non-behavioural (or arithmetic) microsimulation model developed by the
New Zealand Treasury.7 It contains the details of the social security and personal tax
system and produces analyses at individual, family and household level. It utilises the
Household Economic Survey (HES), a cross-sectional dataset collected by Statistics New
Zealand. The model uses most of the income data from HES which includes income from
current jobs and other income such as interest and dividends. The Treasury’s behavioural
model, TaxWell-B, uses information for each sample individual, provided by TaxWell, on
disposable incomes at the specified range of discrete hours labour supply levels before and
after the reform, along with the individual and household characteristics. TaxWell-B thus
uses estimated parameters of the deterministic component of preference functions on which
the behavioural responses are based.
TaxWell-B assumes a 100 per cent take-up rate for welfare benefits. This may lead to
some overestimation of expenditure on the different payments in both pre-reform and post-
reform situations. However, as the policy changes do not expand eligibility, the simulated
percentage changes reported here are not expected to be biased. All persons for whom
labour supply is modelled, except sole parents, are potentially eligible for Unemployment
Benefits (UB). Sole parents are eligible for DPB. The income-test rules are then applied to
calculate actual benefit levels.
The budget constraints for each individual, giving net incomes at each discrete hours
level, clearly require knowledge of hourly wage rates. For workers these are directly observed.
However, they are unobserved for non-workers in survey data. For these individuals, it
is therefore necessary to impute their wage rates using wage equations which correct for
potential sample selection bias. Wage equations were estimated separately for partnered
men, partnered women, single men, single women and sole parents using pooled HES data
6This random component should be distinguished from ‘optimising frictions’ associated with adjustment
costs, discussed by Chetty (2012). He argued that these are more important at the intensive margin, and
may bias microeconometric estimates of labour supply responses.
7The name is a tribute to Ivan Tuckwell, who played a substantial role in the development of the previous
Treasury arithmetic model, TaxMod.
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from 2006/07 to 2010/11: see Mercante and Mok (2014b).
As mentioned above, the behavioural responses generated by TaxWell-B are based on
the use of quadratic preference functions allowing for observed and unobserved heterogene-
ity. For couples, labour supplies are jointly determined. The parameters of the preference
functions were estimated using pooled HES dataset from 2006/07 to 2010/11: see Mercante
and Mok (2014a).
A policy simulation involves comparing the observed hours level of each individual in the
basic HES sample, having the pre-reform tax and benefit structure, with the distribution of
hours (over the discrete points) generated by the post-reform tax structure and net incomes.
The HES 2009/10 was used for simulations of the effect of the change in tax and transfer
rules from April 2010 to October 2010. It is important that the observed hours in the
pre-reform case can be regarded as an optimal position for each individual. For this reason
a ‘calibration’ process is used to select a set of random draws from the distribution of
the stochastic component of utility which are used for post-reform computations. This is
described briefly as follows.
The behavioural simulation procedure for each individual or couple begins by converting
the observed working hours to the closest discrete working-hours level. Then, given the
parameter estimates of the preference functions (using a range of characteristics of individ-
uals to allow for observed heterogeneity), the deterministic components of utility for each
hours level are calculated for the net incomes generated by the pre-reform tax and transfer
system. Then a set of random draws is taken from the Type-I extreme-value distribution.
For each set of draws (one for each discrete hours level) the utility-maximising hours level is
determined by adding the random draw to the deterministic component of utility for each
discrete working-hours level and determining the hours level giving maximum total utility.
The sets for which observed and optimum hours in the pre-reform situation are equal are
retained for use in the post-reform evaluation.
To obtain a distribution over the available discrete hours levels, a number of sets of draws
are obtained (and retained) in order to provide a sufficient number of sets for which the opti-
mal hours level matches the observed working hours before the reform: in the simulations
reported below, this number of sets is 100. The retained draws are then used to determine
the distribution of optimal hours levels after the reform, for each individual. Hence the
resulting distribution for each individual after the reform is the conditional probability dis-
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tribution, given that the individual is at observed discretised hours initially. An alternative
approach would be to obtain unconditional distributions pre- and post-reform, based on the
multinomial logit properties. However, it is preferred to make use of the sample information
about actual hours in the base, that is pre-reform, situation. The calibration approach also
ensures that the results before the reform are comparable between TaxWell and TaxWell-B
(except that TaxWell does not discretised the hours levels before the reform).
In some cases, the required number of sets of random draws producing pre-reform
observed hours as the optimal hours cannot be generated within a designated maximum
number of drawings. Under such circumstances, the individual’s labour supply is held fixed
at the observed hours. However, this problem arises for very few individuals in the sample.
Labour supply for some groups is held constant: these are retirees (801 cases), self-
employed (390 cases), full-time students, disabled and others (660 cases). These groups
are expected to behave differently from the other individuals of working age and tend to
be less responsive to changes in financial incentives. After excluding these groups, there
are 2,160 (from the total of 4,011) families in the HES sample for whom the effects of the
policy reform on labour supply are simulated, representing 67 per cent of the working age
population.
4 Simulated labour supply responses
As explained in the previous section, the policy simulation generates, for each individual, a
conditional probability distribution of hours supplied under the post-reform structure, con-
ditional on the individual being placed at the pre-reform observed (discretised) hours level.
A range of summary measures of the labour supply changes is thus available. Subsection
4.1 provides preliminary results relating to arithmetic mean changes in hours supplied and
participation rates for each demographic group. The arithmetic means are obtained over all
hours levels and individuals. These aggregative measures necessarily conceal a considerable
amount of heterogeneity. Indeed, a small positive increase in average hours of work sup-
plied at, say, the intensive margin can be associated with many large positive and negative
changes made by individuals (who are also, by assumption, limited to making changes with
at least five-hour intervals). More details are thus revealed by transition matrices, which
are reported for the different demographic groups in Subsection 4.2.
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4.1 Average labour supply responses
Table 3 presents the simulated labour supply responses for all demographic groups. However,
the first block of the table provides information about the composition of the population
(the percentages in each labour market and demographic category).
As explained above, the microsimulation model produces, for each individual, a condi-
tional distribution of hours supplied after the tax reform, given that the individual’s optimal
hours before the reform correspond to actual observed hours. The labour supply responses
in Table 3 refer to the difference for each person between the pre-reform discretised hours
and the arithmetic mean of the post-reform conditional hours distribution. The average
working hours post-reform are then obtained for each group as the mean of the individual
conditional averages. Average hours pre-reform are simply the average for the group of the
actual discretised hours levels. The table shows that average hours supplied increase for all
groups, reflecting the dominance of the substitution effect of the policy change.
The largest change shown in Table 3 is observed for sole parents, with an average weekly
increase in the arithmetic mean hours supplied of around 20 minutes (0.33 hours). In
addition, sole parents show the largest increase at the intensive margin, with average workers
working more hours increasing by 0.56 percentage points. At the extensive margin, relating
to entering the labour force when initially working zero hours, the proportion working
increases by 0.86 percentage points. This implies (after grossing up to population values
using the sample weights), around 49,000 hours of work increase a week by sole parents,
where 82 per cent of this is attributed to workers entering the labour market. Only 46 per
cent participated in the labour market before the policy changes. Before the reform, sole
parents who were working worked 31.6 hours on average.
It is possible to obtain confidence intervals for these changes, following the method pro-
posed by Creedy, Kalb and Kew (2007). These were calculated separately for sole parents,
married couples with and without dependents and single men and women. Consider the
change in average hours of sole parents, which from Table 3 is 0.33. The 90 per cent con-
fidence interval for this group is found to be 0.29 to 0.51 hours. The 90 per cent interval
for married men with dependents is 0.06 to 0.09. For married women with dependents this
interval is 0.07 to 0.11 hours. The average hours change for single women has a 90 per
cent confidence interval of 0.14 to 0.2 hours. These relatively low confidence intervals are
explained by the low standard errors of the parameter estimates of the preference functions
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on which the simulations are based.8 They do not allow for sampling errors.
Table 3: Simulated responses of labour supply (All groups)
Couples
No children With children Single persons Sole
Labour force status (percentage) M F M F M F Parents
Wage & self employed: pre reform 66.05 60.34 88.2 65.21 57.45 54.26 45.99
Wage & salary workers: pre reform 50.88 54.32 70.97 56.71 52.58 51.22 42.05
Wage & salary workers: post reform 50.98 54.47 71.07 56.85 52.71 51.55 42.91
Behavioural Response
Non-work to work transition (ppt) 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.22 0.13 0.32 0.86
Work to non-work transition (ppt) 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00
Workers working more (ppt) 0.14 0.10 0.32 0.26 0.05 0.35 0.56
Workers working less (ppt) 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.04
Average hours change 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.17 0.33
Average hours: pre reform 20.2 18.4 29.5 17.8 18.9 16.8 13.3
Average hrs change: workers only 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.14
Average hours: pre reform workers 39.7 33.8 41.6 31.4 36.0 32.8 31.6
The policy changes result in higher participation and average working hours for both
married men and women. The effects are more prominent for couples with children. The net
percentage point increase in working hours is highest for married men with children. Their
participation rate is also the highest amongst the subgroups. However, the net increase
in participation is higher for married women. These changes imply (after grossing up)
approximately 60,000 and 80,000 hours of work increase a week for married men and women
respectively. Here, 70 per cent and 60 per cent of these increases respectively, for married
men and women, are attributed to increased participation rates for couples with and without
children. Married men with children who are working prior the reform are already working
on average 41.6 hours a week, and the policy reform causes a slight increase in their average
hours of work supplied of 0.04 .
For singles, the simulated policy changes also result in higher participation and working
hours for both men and women. However, the effects are more prominent for single women.
Single women experienced the highest net percentage point increase in their participation
rates and average hours of work supplied. On average, single men work around 18.9 hours
a week while single men who are currently working work around 36 hours. These are higher
8Confidence intervals were obtained for the other responses, but in view of their relatively small size they
are not reported here.
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than for single women, who work on average around 16.8 hours a week, while single women
who are working work about 32.8 hours. This implies more than 80,000 hours of work
increase a week for single women, where 67 per cent of this is attributed to new participants
in the labour market.
4.2 Transition matrices
Further details of the potential labour supply responses, reflecting the complexities arising
from the highly nonlinear budget constraints discussed above, are provided by transition
matrices. These use the full information about the conditional post-reform hours distribu-
tions obtained for each individual.
The transition matrix for sole parents is shown in Table 4. Movements are effectively
from rows to columns so that, for example, of those who initially did not work, there is a
probability of 98.5 per cent that they continue not to work after the reform. In this and the
following tables an entry of ‘—’ indicates that no transitions arise, whereas an entry of zero
indicates a negligible proportion of transitions.
Of the off-diagonal entries, relatively few positive values are below the leading diagonal.
In addition, the higher probabilities of increasing hours worked are for those working 20
hours or more before the reform. A feature of the conditional distributions shown along
the rows of the table is that they are multi-modal. This reflects the non-convexity of the
budget sets discussed above, where small changes in the net wage can lead to relatively large
‘jumps’ in the number of hours of work supplied.
Further details of the conditional distributions of labour supply changes for couples with
children are shown in Tables 5 and 6. A small proportion of married men and women
with children increased hours of work. However, a small proportion of married women
with children exit the labour market, especially where they were working at higher hours
before the policy reform takes place, as indicated in the first column of Table 6. Again the
conditional distributions show the kind of multi—modality that is expected as a result of
non-convexities in the budget set, such that even small changes in the net wage can lead
the individual to make a large change in labour supply. The small probability of movement
from work to non work for the married women is associated with the non-convexity in the
budget sets for many of this group, caused by the fixed cost of working.
Tables 7 and 8 present the labour supply transition matrices for single men and women.
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Table 4: Sole parents’ labour supply transitions (row to column)
Labour supply in hours per week
Post-reform
Pre-reform 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Total
0 98.5 — 0 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 58
5 — 98.1 — — — — 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 2.4
10 — — 98 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.1 3.2
15 — — — 97.1 0.2 1 0.2 0.7 — 0.4 0.3 2.0
20 — — — — 97.8 — 0 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.7 3.8
25 — — — — — 99 — 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.2 1.5
30 — — — — 0.1 0 99.5 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 3.8
35 — — — — 0.1 0 0.1 97.1 0.2 0.9 1.6 5.4
40 — — — — — — 0.1 — 99.1 0.2 0.5 15.5
45 — — — — — — 0.3 — — 99.4 0.4 1.3
50 — — — — — — — — — — 100 3.2
Total % 57.1 2.4 3.1 2.1 3.9 1.7 4 5.4 15.5 1.5 3.5 100
Table 5: Married men with children labour supply transitions (row to column)
Labour supply in hours per week
Post-reform
Pre-reform 0 10 20 30 40 50 Total %
0 99.6 — 0 0 0.2 0.2 29
10 — 99.9 — — 0.1 — 1.6
20 0.2 — 99.5 — 0.1 0.2 0.8
30 — — — 99.2 0.4 0.4 2.6
40 0 — 0 0.1 99.3 0.6 45.8
50 0 — 0 0 0.1 99.8 20.3
Total % 28.9 1.6 0.8 2.6 45.5 20.6 100
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Table 6: Married women with children labour supply transitions (row to column)
Labour supply hours per week
Post-reform
Pre-reform 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Total %
0 99.5 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 43.3
5 — 99.7 — — — — — 0.2 — — 0.1 1.5
10 0.2 0 98.4 — 0 — — 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.3 2.6
15 0.1 0 — 98.5 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 4.2
20 0.2 — — — 98.8 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.6
25 0.3 0 — — 0 98.9 0.1 0 0.2 0.1 0.2 6.5
30 0.1 0 0 0 — 0 99.6 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 7.2
35 0.2 — — — 0 0 0.2 99.2 — 0.1 0.2 5.7
40 0.1 — 0 — 0 0 0 0 99.7 0.1 0.1 16.1
45 0 — — — 0 — 0 0 0 99.9 — 3.4
50 0.4 0.1 — — — — 0 0 0 0 99.5 4
Total % 43.2 1.5 2.6 4.2 5.5 6.4 7.2 5.7 16.1 3.5 4.1 100
These show that single men mostly stay at their current working hours or, at the higher
hours levels, increase their labour supply due to the policy changes. For single women, a
small proportion increase their hours of work.
5 Tax and revenue changes
The labour supply responses affect estimates of government expenditure and revenue. As
mentioned above, the calibration approach used in TaxWell-B ensures that the results before
the reform are comparable with those in TaxWell. However, there are slight differences
because the behavioural model discretises the hours worked before the reform. Table 9
presents the expected change in government revenue and expenditure, with and without
labour supply responses, for all subgroups. However, increased revenue from the GST
increase is not included in these comparisons.
The reduction in the marginal tax rates reduces income tax revenue by about $3,275.8
million and $3,412.1 million, with and without accounting for labour supply responses
respectively. The estimated non-behavioural personal income tax revenue reduction is sim-
ilar to the previous Treasury estimates of $3,467 million in 2011/12 (adjusted to constant
2010, second quarter, dollars) from the Budget 2010 report: see New Zealand Treasury
(2010a, 2010b). The reduction in revenue of $136.3 million (equal to 3 412 − 3 2758)
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Table 7: Single men labour supply transitions (row to column)
Labour supply in hours per week
Post-reform
Pre-reform 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Total %
0 99.7 — — — — 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 47.4
5 — 100 — — — — — — — — — 1.8
10 — — 100 — — — — — — — 0 2.1
15 — — — 100 — — — — — 0 — 2.3
20 — — — — 99.9 — — 0 — 0.1 — 3.1
25 — — — — — 99.5 — — — 0.3 0.2 1.2
30 — — — — — — 99.9 — 0 0 0.1 3.7
35 — — — — — — — 99.7 0 0.1 0.2 3.4
40 — — — — — — — — 99.9 0.1 0.1 21
45 — — — — — — — — — 100 0 6.4
50 — — — — — — — — — — 100 7.5
Total % 47.3 1.8 2.1 2.3 3.1 1.2 3.7 3.4 21 6.5 7.6 100
Table 8: Single women labour supply transitions (row to column)
Labour supply in hours per week
Post-reform
Pre-reform 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Total %
0 99.3 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 48.8
5 — 99 — 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.8
10 — — 99.5 — — 0 0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 4.1
15 — — — 99.2 0 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 3.6
20 — — — — 99.3 — — 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 2.7
25 — — — 0 0.1 98.4 0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4 3.3
30 — — — — — — 98.9 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 3.2
35 — — — — — 0 — 98.5 0.2 0.5 0.8 6.4
40 — — — — — 0 0 — 99.5 0.2 0.2 16.8
45 — — — — — — — — — 99.8 0.2 3.9
50 — — — — — — — 0 0.1 — 99.9 5.5
Total % 48.5 1.8 4.1 3.6 2.7 3.3 3.2 6.3 16.8 4.1 5.7 100
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is smaller when labour supply effects are taken into account, as a result of the improved
work incentives. This estimate is slightly lower than the estimated tax effect accounting for
labour supply responses in the 2010 budget forecast of $183 million in 2011/12 (adjusted
to constant 2010, second quarter, dollars). This is caused by the use of a higher overall
hours-worked labour supply elasticity of 0.44 used in the budget report which, as mentioned
above, was drawn from the earlier estimates of preference functions using data from 1991
to 2001: see New Zealand Treasury (2010c). The recently estimated overall hours-worked
elasticity is about 0.31.9
Table 9 shows that all compensation payments, excluding the superannuation payment,
cause total government expenditure to increase by $52.1 million (equal to 1999 − 1478),
when labour supply is assumed to remain constant. Importantly, after allowing for labour
supply changes, the expenditure falls by about $48.3 million (equal to 1478− 995). This
fall in benefit payments is caused by the increased average working hours and participation
rates for all demographic groups. The largest reduction in benefit payments arising from
labour supply changes are for single women, followed by sole parents. In summary, the
labour supply effects help to reduce the cost of the policy changes to the government by
about $236.7 million (equal to 36120 − 33753), from the total of $4.9 billion without
labour supply changes. These comparisons clearly demonstrate the importance of allowing
for potential labour supply responses when considering tax reforms.
It was previously estimated that the tax package will cause an increase of the GST
revenue of $2,672m in 2011/12 (adjusted to constant 2010, second quarter, dollars) and other
changes in tax revenues such as company tax reductions: see New Zealand Treasury (2010a).
The results in Table 9 do not capture these additional forms of revenue. The negative fiscal
impact in the first few years is a transitional effect owing to the time required for revenue
to accrue from some of the base-broadening measures. From the fourth year onwards (up
to the fifth year) of the forecast period (from 2010/11 to 2014/15), the impact on the fiscal
cost is positive, and the tax package is expected to be broadly fiscally neutral taking into
account labour supply responses (for example the extra tax revenue the government receives
due to more people working). Hence, this is important to bear in mind when comparing
the fiscal costs and revenue from the behavioural microsimulation with the actual costs of
the tax package.
9This was obtained using the same sample weights as the previous report.
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Table 9: Tax revenue and expenditure on transfer payments ($m): with and without labour
supply responses
Benefit Rebate Family NZS Total Total Net
Income payment Expend Income tax Expend
Couples
Pre-reform 1861.9 166.3 1908.7 4121.9 8058.7 19924.5
With LS (∆) -21.8 -0.6 32.4 84.1 94.1 -2437.7 2531.8
Without LS (∆) 5.6 -1.9 42.1 84.1 129.9 -2537.8 2667.6
Single men
Pre-reform 1857.0 62.4 0 964.1 2883.5 2941.7
With LS (∆) -12.7 0.2 0 19.5 7.0 -389.6 396.5
Without LS (∆) -3 0 0 19.5 16.5 -398.3 414.8
Single women
Pre-reform 1592.6 47.1 0 2178.7 3818.4 2675.6
With LS (∆) -33.0 1.1 0 44.0 12.1 -337.7 349.8
Without LS (∆) -1.3 0 0 44.0 42.7 -355.4 398.2
Sole parents
Pre-reform (Abs) 2107.8 0 976.5 8.2 3092.5 835.2
With LS (∆) -31.9 0 18 0.2 -13.7 -110.8 97.0
Without LS (∆) -8.8 0 19.4 0.2 10.8 -120.6 131.4
Total
With LS (∆) -99.4 0.7 50.4 147.8 99.5 -3275.8 3375.3
Without LS (∆) -7.5 -1.9 61.5 147.8 199.9 -3412.1 3612.0
Note: ∆ denotes the absolute change
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6 Income distribution
It is of interest to consider the potential effects of the 2010 reforms on the distribution of
disposable incomes. The conditions under which such a change in the tax mix could be
exactly distribution-neutral are extremely strong and not expected to hold in the present
case: see Creedy and Mellish (2011) for further details. Examining the distributional impact
of a policy change in the TaxWell-B behavioural microsimulation model, a special approach
is needed to deal with the fact that it generates a conditional distribution of hours worked
for each individual, rather than a deterministic hours level. For example, using simply
the arithmetic mean hours for each individual provides a poor approximation. However, a
‘pseudo distribution’ method, examined in detail in Creedy, Kalb and Scutella (2004, 2006),
can be used to obtain a range of inequality measures.
Table 10: Gini coefficients by Income unit type
Group Pre-reform Post-reform Difference
Couple 0.335 0.337 0.002
Couple and dependents 0.290 0.294 0.004
Single 0.372 0.374 0.002
Sole parents 0.224 0.228 0.004
All 0.356 0.358 0.002
Inequality comparisons using the Gini measure are shown in Table 10. Similar results
applied using, for example, the Atkinson inequality measure for various degrees of inequality
aversion. The disposable income measure (or ‘welfare metric’) used is household income
per adult equivalent person, where equivalisation is based on the Whiteford (1985) adult
equivalence scales. The unit of analysis is the individual.10 Table 10 shows that there is
a very slight increase of 0.002 in the overall Gini coefficient. Indeed, plots of the Lorenz
curves before and after the reform were found to be indistinguishable. The use of different
equivalent adult scales produced similar changes, though of course different absolute levels.
7 The effects of separate policy changes
In this section, the effects of individual policy changes are discussed separately. Although
the separate effects are not expected to be additive, it is useful to obtain some idea of the
10The inequality measures use the sample weights, so that they apply to population aggregates rather
than simple the individuals in the sample.
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relative importance of the different elements of the package of policy changes.
7.1 Marginal tax rates changes
The simulated effects on average labour supply of changes in only marginal income tax rates
are shown in Table 11. Here the group of married men and women includes those with and
without children combined. Not surprisingly, these labour supply changes are larger than
those shown in Table 3. The effects of combining the income tax rate changes with the
change in GST are shown in the second block of Table 11. As expected, they are closer to
those in Table 3.
Table 11: Labour supply effects of income tax rate changes
Behavioural Response Married Married Single Single Sole
Men Women Men Women Parents
Income tax only
Non-work to work transition (ppt) 0.31 0.50 0.23 0.80 1.63
Work to non-work transition (ppt) 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Workers working more (ppt) 0.35 0.36 0.11 0.74 1.10
Workers working less (ppt) 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.02
Average hours change (hrs) 0.15 0.22 0.11 0.42 0.67
Income tax combined with GST change
Non-work to work transition (ppt) 0.22 0.31 0.20 0.64 0.99
Work to non-work transition (ppt) 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00
Workers working more (ppt) 0.32 0.25 0.08 0.56 0.87
Workers working less (ppt) 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01
Average hours change (hrs) 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.33 0.45
7.2 Working for families changes
The higher GST tax rate was compensated by the increase in the Family Tax Credit rates
and the Minimum Family Tax Credit, while other features (for example, the abatement
threshold) of the Working for Families scheme remain unchanged. The unchanged compo-
nent includes the work tested in-work tax credit where couples must work at least 30 hours
per week (as combined hours) and sole parents for at least 20 hours per week. Table 12
shows that these WfF changes alone — and excluding the GST increase — induce an increase
in sole parent participation of 0.03 percentage points. Married men and women with chil-
dren are more likely to leave the labour market and work fewer hours. The transition to
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non-participation effect of this reform alone is more prominent for married women. Average
labour supply over all married women is expected to decrease by the negligible amount of
0.01 hours per week. This is consistent with the finding that the reduction in the labour
supply of married women is affected mainly by the dominant income effect and most of the
married men with children are already participating in the labour force and are working
over 30 hours before the reform: for further analysis of labour supply effects of WfF, see
Mok and Mercante (2014). Clearly, the labour supply effects would be slightly lower than
the responses shown in Table 12, when combined with the GST increase.
Table 12: Labour supply effects of Working for Families changes
Behavioural Response Couples with children Sole
Men Women Parents
Non-work to work transition (ppt) 0.00 0.00 0.03
Work to non-work transition (ppt) 0.01 0.03 0.00
Workers working more (ppt) 0.01 0.00 0.00
Workers working less (ppt) 0.02 0.01 0.03
Average hours change (hrs) 0.00 -0.01 0.00
7.3 Benefit rates changes
Table 13 shows the simulated responses to changes in only benefit payment rates, and
excluding GST effects. This shows that, for all groups, the income effect seems to dominate
the substitution effect. This leads to an overall decrease in the average hours work. Single
women are more likely to leave the labour market while sole parents are more likely to
work fewer hours. This is probably due to the different abatement rates and thresholds
faced by a single unemployed person and a sole parent who are entitled to the DPB. The
unemployment benefit has an income abatement rate where any income over $80 per week
before tax is reduced by 70 cents for every $1 of income earned. For the DPB, income
between $80 and $180 per week is reduced by 30 cents for each $1 earned and by 70 cents
for every $1 for income above that.
8 Conclusions
This paper has examined the simulated labour supply responses to the personal tax and
transfer policy changes in 2010. The changes included the increase in the GST rate from
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Table 13: Labour supply effects of benefit changes
Behavioural Response Married Married Single Single Sole
Men Women Men Women Parents
Non-work to work transition (ppt) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
Work to non-work transition (ppt) 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.26 0.22
Workers working more (ppt) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Workers working less (ppt) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.22
Average hours change (hrs) -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12
12.5 to 15 per cent. Simultaneously, the government reduced personal income tax rates and
increased the main benefit payments and assistance to families with children to compensate
for the rise in GST. The switch from income tax towards GST was aimed to enhance the
incentive to save, encourage economic growth and improve efficiency.
Simulated responses were obtained using the Treasury’s behavioural microsimulation
model for New Zealand, TaxWell-B, and were based on the Household Economic Survey
in 2009/10. The simulation began with the complete set of changes and then some of
its components were discussed separately. The full effect of policy changes was found to
produce small average increases in labour supply for all demographic groups, reflecting the
dominance of the substitution effect of the policy change.
The largest average increase was observed for sole parents, who have low participation
rates. The simulated average weekly increase in arithmetic mean hours supplied by sole par-
ents was about 20 minutes (0.33 hours). Sole parents show the largest responses from the
reform with large increases in the intensive and extensive margins. At the extensive mar-
gin, relating to entering the labour force when initially working zero hours, the proportion
working increases by 0.86 percentage points.
The policy changes were found to result in higher participation and working hours for
both married men and women, with the effects being more prominent for couples with chil-
dren. The net percentage point increase in working hours was highest for married men
with children, whose participation rate is also the highest amongst the demographic groups.
However, the net increase in participation was higher for married women. Of the single
individuals, single women experienced the highest net percentage-point increase in their
participation rate and average working hours. The averages mask larger and more varied
hours changes, which were reflected in transition matrices showing probabilities of move-
ments between the discrete hours levels from pre-reform to post-reform structures.
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The positive simulated increases in the average labour supply of all demographic groups,
stimulated by the policy reform, also affects estimates of government expenditure and rev-
enue. After allowing for labour supply changes, the cost of the policy change decreases for
all demographic groups. This is mainly reflected in the tax revenue and welfare benefits. As
expected, income tax payments decrease due to the marginal tax reductions. However, the
reduction in revenue is mitigated by the labour supply changes resulting from the improved
work incentives. In addition, the increased labour supply reduces expenditure on welfare
benefits. The largest benefit reduction is observed for single women and sole parents due
to the relatively larger increases in their labour supply. Importantly, these results contrast
strongly with those obtained on the assumption of unchanged labour supply, where benefit
expenditure is expected to increase.
The reform was also found to be approximately distribution-neutral, with an increase
in the overall Gini inequality measure of income per adult equivalent person of only 0.002.
Lorenz curves for pre- and post-reform distributions were found to be indistinguishable.
When considering individual policy changes separately, the reductions in marginal income
tax rates was found to have the largest effect on labour supply. This is not surprising given
that it affects a large proportion of the population while the changes to the benefit system
and assistance to families with children are relevant only to certain groups. The increases
in the main benefit payment rates, taken in isolation, have a work-disincentive effect for all
groups, leading to an overall decrease in the average hours worked.
It must again be stressed that the simulation model, TaxWell-B, is a supply-side partial-
equilibrium model. It can thus examine only individuals’ desired working hours and partic-
ipation rates, on the further assumption that wage rates are not affected. The results are
thus ex ante simulations. Whether actual labour supply, revenue and expenditure move in
similar ways depends crucially on the demand side of the labour market. Here it is worth
bearing in mind that the reforms came when the effects of the global financial crisis were
at their largest. The use of a microsimulation model of this kind can therefore provide only
one component, rather than a prediction, of the likely effects of a tax policy change. How-
ever, such information is preferred to the exclusive reliance on a simple assumption of fixed
labour supply. In addition, it is important to allsow for the considerable degree of hetero-
geneity found in the population, regarding both characteristics and preferences regarding
consumption and leisure.
27
References
[1] Buckle, R.A. (2010) Tax policy reform New Zealand style. New Zealand Economic
Papers, 44, pp. 129-136.
[2] Buckle, R.A. (2015) New Zealand Tax Working Group: are there lessons for tax reform
processes? ANZSOG Annual Conference, Melbourne, Australia (August).
[3] Chetty, Raj (2012) Bounds on elasticities with optimization frictions: a synthesis o
micro and macro evidence on labor supply. Econometrica, 80, pp. 969-1018.
[4] Creedy, John (2004) Labour supply incentives in alternative tax and transfer schemes:
a diagrammatic introduction. Australian Economic Review, 37, pp. 230-241.
[5] Creedy, John (2005) An in-work payment with an hours threshold: labour supply and
social welfare. Economic Record, 81, pp. 367-377.
[6] Creedy, John and Guyonne Kalb (2005) Discrete hours microsimulation: specification,
estimation and simulation. Journal of Economic Surveys, 19, pp. 697-734.
[7] Creedy, John, Guyonne Kalb and Hsein Kew (2007) Confidence intervals for policy
reforms in behavioural tax microsimulation modelling. Bulletin of Economic Research,
59, pp. 37-65.
[8] Creedy, John, Guyonne Kalb and Rosanna Scutella (2004) Evaluating the income dis-
tribution effects of tax reforms in discrete hours models. In Research in Economic
Inequality, Volume 12 (ed. by Y. Amiel and J. Bishop), pp. 199-226. JAI Press.
[9] Creedy, John, Guyonne Kalb and Rosanna Scutella (2006) Income distribution in dis-
crete hours behavioural microsimulation models: an illustration. Journal of Economic
Inequality, 4, pp. 57-76.
[10] Creedy, John and Angela Mellish (2011) Changes in the tax mix from income taxation
to GST: Revenue and redistribution. New Zealand Economic Papers, 45, pp. 299-309.
[11] English, Bill (2010) The 2010 Budget: Building the Recovery. New Zealand Govern-
ment, 20 May, http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/2010
28
[12] Kalb, Guyonne and Rosanna Scutella (2003) New Zealand labour supply from 1991 to
2001: an analysis based on a discrete choice structural model. New Zealand Treasury
Working Paper, 03/23.
[13] Key, John (2010) Statement to Parliament. Presented to the New Zealand House of
Representatives, 9 February.
[14] Mercante, Joseph and Penny Mok (2014a) Estimation of labour supply for New
Zealand. New Zealand Treasury Working Paper, 14/08.
[15] Mercante, Joseph and Penny Mok (2014b) Estimation of wage equations for New
Zealand. New Zealand Treasury Working Paper, 14/09.
[16] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2014) Previous minimum wage
rates. Wellington, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. Available at:
http://www.dol.govt.nz/er/pay/minimumwage/previousminimum.asp
[17] Mirrlees, James (ed.) (2011). Tax by design. London: Oxford University Press.
[18] Mok, Penny and Joseph Mercante (2014) Working for Families changes: The effect on
labour supply in New Zealand. New Zealand Treasury Working Paper, 14/18.
[19] New Zealand Treasury (2010a) Budget 2010 Tax package and the preliminary economic
and fiscal outlook. Available at: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/
informationreleases/budget/2010/tax
[20] New Zealand Treasury (2010b) Budget Economic and Fiscal Update 2010. Available
at: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/forecasts/befu2010.
[21] New Zealand Treasury (2010c) Technical Note on the Basis of Assumptions
Regarding the Effect of the Tax Package on Forecast and Projected Eco-
nomic Growth. Available at: http://www.treasury.govt.nz/budget/forecasts/
befu2010/assumptions-taxpackage-may10.pdf.
[22] Statistics New Zealand (2010) Statistics New Zealand clarifies
impact of GST on CPI. Available at http://www.stats.govt.nz/
browse_for_stats/Corporate/Corporate/CorporateCommunications_
MRimpact-of-GST-on-CPIimpact-of-GST-on-CPI.aspx
29
[23] Van Soest, Arthur (1995) Structural models of family labor supply: A discrete choice
approach. The Journal of Human Resources, 30, pp. 63-88.
[24] Tax Working Group (2010). A tax system for New Zealand’s future. Victoria University
of Wellington. Available at: http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/cagtr/twg/Report.
aspx.
[25] Whiteford, Peter (1985) A family’s needs: equivalence scales, poverty and social secu-
rity. Department of Social Security, Camberra, Research Paper, no. 27.
30
Working Papers in Public FinanceChair in Public Finance Victoria Business School
 About the Authors 
 
 John Creedy is Professor of Public Finance at Victoria Business School, 
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, and a Principal Advisor
at the New Zealand Treasury. 
Email: john.creedy@vuw.ac.nz
 
Penny Mok is an Analyst at the New Zealand Treasury in Wellington, 
New Zealand.
Email: penny.mok@treasury.govt.nz 
  
 
 
 
